1. INTRODUCTION

The African Union (AU)’s Committee of Ten (10) on UN Security Council Reform is scheduled to meet at Ministerial level in the Zambian capital of Lusaka, 4 to 5 June, 2025. This will be the thirteenth Meeting at Ministerial level.  The committee comprises the following AU Member States. Sierra Leone, Kenya, Uganda, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Senegal, Namibia, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Algeria and Zambia.  Zambia’s President Hakainde Hichilema is expected to deliver the Opening address at the meeting 

The back ground to the Committee of 10 can be traced to the 1990s. This is because since the Cold War ended in 1990, the matter of enlarging the UN Security Council has gained much traction in the discourse on international affairs and multilateralism.  The major sticking point has evolved around the issue of making the United Nations’ preeminent body more representatives of the diversity of the membership of the Global organization (Yeboah, Patricia, 2012).  Currently the Security Council is made up of the Permanent Five or P5, namely the USA, UK, France, Russian Federation, Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and; the ten non-permanent members who serve on two-year rotational terms. Of the Ten non-Permanent Members, Africa has three places. The bitter irony relating to Africa’s scant representation on the Council is that the bulk of emergencies and crises that the Council has to grapple with are located on the African continent. 

The official position of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), precursor to the African Union (AU), in respect of reforming the UN Security Council was that the present Council is not numerically proportionate to the UN General Assembly membership and is in danger of losing the trust and faith of the overall membership unless it achieves a more balanced representation. (Mulikita, 1998,14).  Additionally, the emergence of Japan and Germany as economic superpowers and the relative decline of permanent members United Kingdom and France from global to middle ranking powers have prompted loud and understandable reservations regarding their inclusion as permanent members entitled to the much-coveted veto prerogative (Yeboah, 2012, 11)

2. THE EZULWINI CONSENSUS AND SIRTE DECLARATION

Initially, two decades ago, in 2005, a group of African leaders set up the African Union Committee pf Ten with a mandate to press for a Common position as per the reform of the UNSC (Ovigwe Egeugu et al, 2024, CSIS). In the same year the AU adopted two documents to serve documents to serve as the framework for its common position on UN reforms, the first was the Ezulwini Consensus, adopted by the 22^nd Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council of the AU in March,2005 and the second was the Sirte Declaration which was adopted in June,2005. The Consensus contained reform points for the United Nations such as boosting its capacity to address development challenges, governance, increasing African participation by expanding the UN Secretariat, and most importantly calling for Africa to be fully represented in all the decision-making organs of the UN particularly in the Security Council where the continent should have no less than two permanent seats with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership.

3. RESPONSES TO EZULWINI CONSENSUS

• Proposal of the Group of Four(G4)

The G4 is a group of countries (Brazil, India, Germany and Japan) who are advocating for an expansion of the UNSC to reflect realities of today. In line with this, it has called for new national permanent seats, which would be assigned by choosing the economically strongest and most influential countries of the international system. In their 2005 official proposal to the UN, the G4 members put themselves as the main candidates for these seats together with an unspecified African country. The G4 model proposes that six new permanent seats would be created together with four new two-year non-permanent seats, making for a Council of 25.

The African Union response to the proposal of G4 has been tepid and lukewarm. The AU has recalcitrantly stuck to its position of two permanent seats with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership.

• The Uniting for Consensus (UfC) Proposal

The Uniting for Consensus Group is a loose association of nations either opposing more permanent seats as a matter of democratic principle, or seeking to prevent the ascension to permanency of one or other of their regional rivals. Pakistan, for examples implacably opposes India’s quest to become a permanent member of the UNSC. In South America, Argentina looks askance at Brazils aspiration to become a permanent member of the Council.  In Western Europe, Italy opposes Germany’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN’s preeminent body. The UfC model is centred on an enlargement of the non-permanent from ten to twenty. These members would be elected by the General Assembly for a two-year term and would be eligible for immediate re-election, subject to the decision of their respective geographical groups

4. RIVALRY AND DISARRAY IN THE AFRICAN UNION ON IMPLEMENTING THE EZULWINI CONSENSUS

The evidence currently available shows that there is division and rivalry among member states of the African Union and indecisiveness of African states prevents the African continent from achieving the objectives of the Ezulwini Consensus. The AU has declared emphatically that it should be responsible for the selection of states which will represent Africa on the enlarged UNSC. Nonetheless it has not made any selection to date. This notwithstanding, three states (Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa) have put themselves forward as the possible contenders for the seats, which in turn has compelled them to seek support or possible alliances with other members of the UN. During a meeting between the AU and G4 on Security Council reform in September 2005 in London, Nigeria and South Africa were very quick to accept the position of the G4, overlooking that they are part of the whole and that until they decide to break away, all decisions would have to be agreed by the majority of the Africa group.  The position of taken by Nigeria and South Africa during their meeting with the G4 sows doubts on the minds of other members of the AU as to whether these two states are committed to the common position outlined in the Ezulwini consensus or they are in it for their own national interest and prestige.

Perhaps it is time for the African Union to rethink the fundamental premise underlying the Ezulwini Consensus.  Why does the AU not back the position of the UfC group to increase the number of non-permanent Members of the UN Security Council? It seems to me that it will be easier for the AU to achieve consensus on selecting non-permanent members than to choose countries like Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa; countries that scarcely conceal their hegemonic tendencies.

5. CONCLUSION

The meeting of the Committee of Ten in Lusaka will not result in a definitive announcement of the names of the two countries who will be proposed to take-up permanent membership on an enlarged UN Security Council. The final communique will simply be a repetition of overworked clichés and platitudes about the moral incorrectness and historic injustice of Africa’s scant representation on the UN Security Council and will exhort the international community to ameliorate this historical injustice. The communique will be a diplomatic façade behind which AU member states can mask their rivalries, suspicions and jealousies amongst themselves. In the ultimate analysis it will just be a classic illustration of ‘All sound and fury signifying nothing’  

6. References

• Mulikita N M, (1998), ‘Reforming the UN Security Council: What Role for the OAU?’ Southern African Political & Economic Monthly (SAPEM), September-October

• Ovigwe Egeugu, Hannah Ryder and Trevor Lwere, (2024), ‘Africa’s Design for a Reformed UN Security Council’, Centre for Strategic & International Studies; csis.org/analysis /africas-design-reformed -un-s
• Yeboah P, (2012), Redefining the United Nations: Challenges and Prospects of the Ezulwini Consensus, MA Dissertation, University of Ghana, Legon